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1. New Realism 
 
The first move of what I proposed to call “New Realism”2 is 
conceptual clarification, which focuses on stressing the difference between 
ontology (what there is, which is independent of our representations) and 
epistemology (what we think we know, which may be dependent on our 
representations—but what makes our statements true are not our 
representations, but that to which those representations relate). Now, it 
makes perfect sense to assume that there is a conceptual action going on 
when I recognize a constellation,3 or when, looking at three objects, I 
believe—like LeĞniewski—that for every two objects there is one which is 
their sum, multiplying the number of objects.4 But this conflict can be 
explained by the simple consideration that we cannot see properly neither 
the constellations nor LeĞniewski’s objects, but only the stars and the three 
objects recognized by common sense. 
This is not to argue that constellations are not real, but rather to draw a 
difference (which obviously stems from the difference between ontology 
and epistemology) between two layers of reality that fade into each other. 
The first is what I would call İ-reality, meaning by this “epistemological 
reality”, or what the Germans call “Realität”. It is the reality linked to 
what we think we know about what there is (which is why I call it 
“epistemological”). This is the reality referred to by Kant when he says 
that “intuitions without concepts are blind”; or by Quine when he says that 
“to be is to be the value of a variable”. But next to, or rather below, the İ-
reality I also set the Ȧ-reality in the sense of ੕ȞĲȦȢ (I use the omega just to 
make a distinction): the ontological reality, or what the Germans call 
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“Wirklichkeit”, which refers to what there is whether we know it or not, 
and which manifests itself both as a resistance and as positivity.  
The second move made by New Realism, after that of conceptual 
clarification, is an empirical observation. There is a class of representations 
that I think will never be able to accompany: that of the infinite number of 
things that existed before any I think. I call this argument “pre-existence”:5 
the world is given prior to any cogito. Then there are classes of 
representations that, even though accompanied by the I think, seem to 
resist it, without regard of the so-called “representational dependence”; I 
call this argument “resistance”:6 reality may resist our conceptual schemes. 
And then it often happens that the I think successfully interacts with 
beings presumably devoid of any I think, for example with animals; I call 
this argument “interaction”:7 beings with different conceptual schemes can 
interact in the same world. I collect these empirical circumstances—
which, however, have a transcendental role, since they define, even though 
in retrospect, our possibilities of knowledge—under the name of 
“unamendability”:8 the key feature of what there is is its prevalence over 
epistemology, because it cannot be corrected—and this is, after all, an 
infinitely more powerful necessity than any logical necessity. 
On the topic of unamendability two clarifications are necessary. The 
first is that reality cannot be corrected in the sense that things continue to 
exist regardless of what we think of them (while we can affect their 
existence through action, both in the social world and in the physical). 
Second, the notions of pre-existence, resistance, interaction and 
unamendability refer to a basic ontological factor: that is, causality. Things 
in the world act causally (and thus in a pre-existing, resistant, interactive 
and unamendable way) upon us, and we are things in the world as well. 
Hence the third move of New Realism: affordance. The real does not 
only manifest itself as resistance and negativity: every negation entails a 
determination and a possibility. The world exerts an affordance,9 through 
the objects and the environment, that qualifies as a positive realism.10 The 
thesis I defend through the argument of affordance11 is that we should start 
from the objects (an area in which, as I said, subjects are also included), so 
as to reduce the gap between our theories and our experience of the world. 
This is not meant to be a futile worship of objectivity (which is a property 
of knowledge, not of being), but a due recognition of the positivity on 
which we all rely, but upon which we rarely reflect. 
This does not only apply to physical experiences: the way in which 
beauty, or moral value or non-value come forward is clearly the 
manifestation of something that comes from outside of us, surprising and 
striking us. And it has value precisely because it comes from outside: 
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otherwise it would be nothing but imagination. That is why, contrary to 
what is often said, one cannot distinguish the value from the fact: trivially, 
this is because the fact is itself a value, and the highest one, i.e. positivity, 
12 which in turn is the condition for the possibility of each value.  
In this regard it is necessary to clarify a statement that might seem too 
trenchant. Facts have the characteristic of being independent of us and of 
affecting us (i.e., of acting causally on us), and this, in fact, is their 
fundamental value. However, “value” is usually a standard against which 
to assess things and facts. Beauty is a value in the sense that it allows us to 
evaluate something as more/less beautiful, and similarly justice allows us 
to evaluate something as more/less just. Instead, facts are not “more/less 
real” but simply real, and they do not allow us to evaluate anything other 
than themselves. Another way to express this difference is to say that facts 
exist exerting causality while values exist exerting normativity. However, 
as will be clear in the part of this essay dedicated to emergence, 
normativity derives from the sphere of facts, so causality is the necessary 
(though not sufficient) condition of normativity. 
At this point—and it is the fourth move of New Realism—it becomes 
possible to articulate the characteristics of the affordance that comes to us 
from the objects. We need to begin by introducing, next to the categories 
of natural objects (which exist in space and time independently of the 
subjects) and ideal objects (which exist outside of space and time, 
independently of the subject), two new categories: that of artefacts, which 
exist in space and time depending on the subjects for their genesis, and 
that of social objects, which exist in space and time depending on the 
subjects for their genesis and their persistence.13 From this point of view, it 
is entirely legitimate to assert that the stock market or democracy are 
representationally dependent (I will soon try to clarify this term since, as 
we have seen, it is rather obscure) on our collective beliefs. But this does 
not mean in any way that dinosaurs have some degree of dependence with 
respect to our collective beliefs. If anything, dependence concerns 
professorships in paleontology. 
The fifth and final move of New Realism consists in isolating the 
concept of environment: everything, including corporations, symbolist 
poems and categorical imperatives, has its origin in the affordance offered 
by the environment. A cave offers affordances for different types of beings 
and serves as a shelter because it has certain characteristics and not others. 
Ecosystems, state organizations, interpersonal relationships: in each of 
these structures (infinitely more complex than a cave) we find the same 
structure of resistance and affordance, which from causality may (though 
not necessarily) evolve into normativity. I define “environment” every 
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sphere in which these interactions take place, from an ecological niche to 
the social world—of course, each with its own characteristics. 
The perspective suggested by “To exist is to resist in an environment” 
(which can be articulated in positive as: “To exist is to produce effects—
causal or normative—in an environment”) is that of a structurally opaque 
existence that manifests itself first of all in its persistence and possibly in 
its acting in an environment, without further qualifications. In other words, 
the field of sense is in the environment and not in the head; it is in the 
affordance and not in the concepts. Obviously, starting from the objects 
and from the opacity of existence involves being aware that there can 
never be a full totality, and rather that our relationship with the world lies 
on a confusing balance between ontology and epistemology. This, 
however, does not mean that the positivity of objects is precluded to us. 
Indeed, it is this very positivity that allows us to dwell in the world despite 
the fact that our notions are rarely clear and distinct. 
2. Documentality 
I call “Documentality”14 the environment in which social objects are 
generated. In the definition of documentality the concepts of craft, writing 
and recording are central. Craft is, strictly speaking, any possibility of 
recording, which heralds the possibility of iteration: that is, the most 
manifest form in which technology comes into our experience. Now, the 
craft of all crafts, in our historical experience, is precisely writing. And 
contrary to what was posited by Plato, external writing has three 
incalculable advantages compared to inner writing, which takes place on 
the soul. First, public accessibility. No one can look into the minds of 
others, but to read the texts of others is more than possible; contracts, 
money, encyclopaedias: all of the social world and the world of knowledge 
require this resource. Second, while internal writing is destined to 
disappear with us, external writing can survive even without us. Third, the 
ability to produce more copies of the same entity (a form of repetition that 
it would perhaps be more appropriate to define “instantiation”15). 
Especially, note this: if we look at its essence, any form of recording is 
a kind of writing. A video or voice message that you can play as you like 
(which today is technically very easy) are forms of writing, just as a 
computer file or a piece of paper. If we consider that recording, as 
permanence of the memory trace, is also the condition of possibility of 
thought—as suggested by the old metaphor of the mind as a tabula, as a 
support for registration—it is not difficult to recognize the centrality of 
this category, which was instead systematically neglected in favour of 
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others (mind, action ...) in the analysis of the construction of social and 
mental reality.16 
From this point of view, it is possible to assert that society is not based 
on communication, but on recording. Since there is nothing social outside 
the text, papers, archives and documents constitute the foundation of the 
social world. I repeat: society is not based on communication, but on 
recording, which is the condition for the creation of social objects. Man 
socializes through recording. Bare life is but a remote start: culture begins 
very early—manifesting itself through recordings and imitation (language, 
behaviour, rituals). This explains why writing and the sphere of recordings 
that precedes and surrounds writing are so important. 
Equipped with these tools, we now have a system that explains both 
the media and social reality, even in its bureaucratic dimension. The 
constitutive law of social objects is Object = Inscribed Act. That is to say 
that a social object is the result of a social act (such as to involve at least 
two people, or a delegated machine and a person) that is characterized by 
being recorded, on a piece of paper, on a computer file, or even only in the 
minds of the people involved in the act. Social objects are divided into 
documents in a strong sense, as inscriptions of acts, and documents in a 
weak sense, as recordings of facts. Once recorded, the social object, 
dependent on minds as to its genesis, becomes independent as to its 
existence—the same thing happens in the case of artefacts, with the only 
important difference that an artefact can offer its affordance even in the 
absence of minds (a table can be a shelter for an animal), while a 
document cannot. 
It can certainly be argued that documental recording is not sufficient 
without a normative social practice behind it. Banknotes become waste 
paper if there is no normative institutional background to support them. In 
fact, if mere recording were enough for the existence of social objects, 
then the old European currencies would continue to be valid even when 
they are actually worth nothing because in the meantime their regulatory 
environment has changed. But if—as I articulate in the section dedicated 
to the emergence—documentality is the source of intentionality and 
normativity, then I think that this objection loses its validity, as evidenced 
by the fact that a collective amnesia (i.e., the disappearance of 
documentality) would coincide with the disappearance of intentionality 
and normativity. In other words, the institutional background that supports 
documentality is in turn a documental background, and so on ad infinitum. 
Documentality has an immediate heuristic advantage. A theory of 
mind-dependence will always have intrinsically obscure aspects because it 
does not entail a simple causal dependence. For social objects to exist, it is 
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necessary that there are at least two minds and normally, in complex 
phenomena, there are many more. In such complex social cases, usually 
many minds do not think in any way about the object and yet they interfere 
with it, while many others do think about it and yet are unable to 
successfully interfere with it (think of a financial crisis, or a war). 
Apparently, we are dealing with a puzzle: social objects, as we have seen, 
are dependent on the mind, but they are independent of knowledge (i.e., 
even of consciousness). A marriage that nobody knows anything about did 
still take place; in the same way, there may be a recession even though no 
one suspects it. 
How is this possible? Does this not mean to argue that social objects 
are both dependent on and independent of the mind? No, it does not. The 
contradiction would present itself only if “mind dependence” were 
understood as dependence on one mind, as if anyone could determine the 
course of the social world. But this assumption is contradicted by any 
experience of the social world (my mind does not make the laws, nor the 
prices of goods, at most it can write this article), as well as by the fact that 
in many circumstances our own mind seems to be independent of itself, 
such as when we develop obsessive thoughts that we would rather not 
have.  
If we no longer have a contradiction between “dependence on the 
mind” and “independence from knowledge”, we still have to explain how 
social objects can persist even when we do not have consciousness or 
knowledge of them. That is why I argue that the foundation of the social 
environment is documentality. In fact, when dealing with social objects we 
do not have to do with a series of intentionalities that consciously keep the 
object alive, so to speak, as if we all thought at the same time about the 
Constitution. It is not so: the Constitution is written, and at this point it is 
valid even if no one thinks about it (which in fact happens all too often). 
In addition to solving the puzzle of mind-dependence and independence 
from consciousness, documentality also allows us to provide a more solid 
basis for the constitutive rule proposed by the most influential theorist of 
social objects, John Searle: namely the rule “X counts as Y in C” (the 
physical object X counts as the social object Y in the context C). The limit 
of such proposal is twofold. On the one hand, it does not seem able to 
account for complex social objects (such as businesses) or negative entities 
(such as debts, in which case it seems difficult to find a corresponding 
physical object). On the other hand, it makes the entire social reality 
depend on the action of a completely mysterious entity (as opposed to 
documents), that is, collective intentionality, which allegedly manages the 
transformation of the physical into the social. 
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According to the version that I propose, on the contrary, it is very easy 
to account for the totality of social objects, from informal promises to 
businesses and even negative entities such as debts. In all these cases there 
is a minimal structure, which is guaranteed by the presence of at least two 
people who commit an act (which may consist of a gesture, a word, or 
writing) that can be recorded on some kind of writing surface, even if it 
were only the tabula of human memory. In addition to accounting for the 
physical basis of the social object—which is not an X available for the 
action of collective intentionality, but a recording that can take place in 
multiple ways—the rule that I propose (and which I call the “rule of 
documentality” as opposed to the “rule of intentionality”) has the 
advantage of not making social reality depend on a function, i.e. collective 
intentionality. In fact, such function is dangerously close to a purely 
mental process: this has led Searle to make a statement that is anything but 
realistic, namely that the economic crisis is largely the result of 
imagination.17 From my perspective, on the contrary, since this is a form 
of documentality, money is anything but imaginary, and this circumstance 
allows us to draw a distinction between the social (what records the acts of 
at least two people, even if the recording takes place in the minds of those 
people and not on external documents) and the mental (which can take 
place only in the mind of a single person). 
Of course, it could be noted that the Constitution applies even if 
nobody thinks about it, but it ceases to have any value if there is no one 
who is able to read it or is simply willing to follow its dictates. The 
validity of what is written in a document remains dependent on a system 
of practices that makes the content of the document normative. Otherwise, 
it would be impossible to distinguish between a current Constitution and a 
Constitution no longer in act, since both are written down somewhere. The 
theory of documentality, if taken to an extreme, could risk not being able 
to explain this fundamental distinction. At this point, however, it is worth 
pointing out that the social cannot be merely “that which records the acts 
of at least two people” but it must also include the practice that supports 
this recording making it valid and normative. That is precisely what I now 
propose to illustrate through the thesis of the emergence of intentionality 
and normativity from documentality. Incidentally, this is intuitively known 
by every advertising investor, who hopes that the iteration of a message 
can generate desires and lifestyles (i.e., intentionality and normativity) 
related to the advertised product. 
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3. Emergence 
It is in what I call environment that the emergence of thought from 
being occurs; such a process can be regarded as the development of an 
(intelligent) epistemology on the basis of an unintelligent ontology, a 
competence that precedes comprehension. The fact that the meaning is not 
in the head,18 but in the world, is a principle well-illustrated in the social 
world and its media, which I regard as equivalent and locate in the sphere 
of documentality. In this regard I would like to suggest two reflections. 
The first one concerns the externalism of meaning, which seems to be 
realized in the Web. The original idea of the semantic web was that 
programmers should classify what they put on the network—a clearly 
unfeasible project. The conception of the environment as a sphere in which 
emergence takes place proposes a Copernican revolution whose basis is 
the thesis, brought forward by Wittgenstein, that “meaning is use”. 
Concretely, let us take the uninterrupted stream of texts (20 billion 
documents) that is the Web, see the exchanges between people and, 
starting from use, derive the meaning. 
 The second one concerns the equivalence between social and media. 
Of course it could be argued that between social and media there is at least 
a quantitative difference. The media seem to ensure a much larger degree 
of iterability, replicability and instantiability than the social, in the strict 
sense. The media might be seen as a powerful enhancement of the 
documental structure that constitutes the social world. The media 
introduce iteration methods that are more and more refined (notational 
rather than purely mechanical) and increasingly pervasive (with 
phonography, photography and cinema one can not only iterate conceptual 
contents, but also perceptual ones). 
What this objection does not seem to take into account is that, with the 
new media, the difference between social and media completely disappears, 
since the same technical devices are delegated to the production of both 
social objects and media content. With the same tablet you can get a plane 
ticket or a certificate, watch a sport event, or produce social and media 
content yourself through a social network. 
The Web is a recording system that generates a superorganism that 
evolves autonomously, just like a termite mound, structuring complex 
articulations in the total absence of a central system19. Now, in the light of 
the Darwinian theory of the mind proposed by Daniel Dennett, we might 
ask ourselves: is it not exactly the same thing for the human brain? Just 
like ants (or like computer memories and the whole Web), single neurons 
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do not “think”, but “download”. Yet the whole of them constitutes 
consciousness and thought. 
I do not mean at all to consider the Web as some sort of macro-
consciousness or macro-brain, with yet another restatement of the thesis—
which in retrospect proved to be fallacious—that the Web is a “collective 
intelligence”.20 I simply assert that the Web, as a macro-archive and macro-
community, presents the same mechanism that takes place in superorganisms 
or in intelligence (natural or artificial), so that organization precedes and 
produces understanding. From this point of view, one could even speak of 
a computer evolutionism, which depends on computers much more than it 
depends on designers, revealing the real needs of society: a calculation 
tool turned into an archive tool, an isolated machine became a machine 
connected to the web. Something similar also happened with the cell 
phone, which was thought of as a tool to talk but tuned into a writing 
device, with the ultimate convergence between phone and computer. 
It is in the environment of documentality that the social “we” takes 
place, through the genesis of what I have proposed we call “documental 
community”.21 Again, we are dealing with a difference with respect to 
collective intentionality, regarded as a sort of natural primitive instinct that 
makes us say “we” instead of “I” in a number of situations, and that is 
allegedly the basis of the construction of the social world. I have more 
than one doubt with regard to this, because in fact the “we” is only reached 
through training. It is true that a group of people on a trip can say “we are 
walking”, but is it still “collective intentionality” when those who are 
walking are a group of prisoners held at gunpoint? In the perspective of 
documentality, it is through the sharing of documents and traditions that a 
“we” is constituted. 
It is precisely for this reason that society has adopted writing and 
archives so early: in order to ensure that the spirit can manifest itself and 
become recognizable, gaining visibility and permanence in time. From this 
point of view, the most transparent form of the “we” is a document bearing 
signatures and exhibiting with honesty the terms, boundaries and 
objectives of the “we”—which, in this version, appears as the conscious 
agreement between a defined number of people for a specific purpose. 
Of course one could argue that this kind of sharing requires that the 
“we” be already constituted. But here I would like to point out that the 
process I described does not constitute a rigid and unidirectional 
determination so that documentality leads to the “we”, but rather a 
virtuous circle for which collective interaction (sharing, made possible by 
iterations, recordings, imitations and education, i.e. various forms of 
documentality) supports the production of documents that enhances 
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collective interaction itself, which in turn enhances the production of 
documents.  
If postmodernists claimed that fiction cancels reality, with a constructionist 
hyperbole, I say that intentionality derives from documentality. The prospect 
of documentality begins with the theory that—from its ancient to its 
modern supporters—conceives of the mind as a tabula on which to lay 
inscriptions. In fact, as we have seen, there is a powerful action of 
inscriptions in social reality: social behaviours are determined by laws, 
rituals and norms; social structures and education form our intentions.  
Imagine an Archi-Robinson Crusoe as the first and last man on the face 
of the earth. Could he really be devoured by the ambition to become an 
admiral, a billionaire or a court poet? Certainly not, just as he could not 
sensibly aspire to follow trends, or to collect baseball cards or still lives. 
And if, say, he tried to fabricate a document, he would be undertaking an 
impossible task, because to produce a document there must be at least two 
people, the writer and the reader. In fact, our Archi-Robinson would not 
even have a language, and one could hardly say that he would “think” in 
the usual sense of the term.22 And it would seem difficult to argue that he 
was proud, arrogant or in love, for roughly the same reason why it would 
be absurd to pretend he had friends or enemies. 
We thus have two circumstances that reveal the social structure of the 
mind. On the one hand, the mind cannot arise unless it is immersed in the 
social, made up of education, language, communication and recording of 
behaviours. On the other hand, there is the huge category of social objects. 
Rather than sketching a world at the subject’s total disposal, the sphere of 
social objects reveals the inconsistency of solipsism: the fact that in the 
world there are also others in addition to us is proven by the existence of 
these objects, which would not have a raison d'etre in a world where there 
was only one subject. There is no thought without social normativity, nor 
is there normativity without the social.23 This brings me to my second 
argument: namely that normativity derives from documentality. 24 
To put things in a more all-encompassing way, as suggested by the 
German mediologist and philosopher Friedrich Kittler,25 the media are not 
so much an extension of man (according to the optimistic view proposed 
by McLuhan), but rather man is the result of the media. Such thesis is all 
the more true now that, as I am suggesting, any difference in principle 
between the media and documentality has ceased to be. Everything that 
becomes powerful can follow its own logic;26 there is nothing surprising 
about this: the general thesis is that any system of emancipation is at the 
same time a control system. Machines emancipate people from physical 
fatigue but deliver them to industrial work. Internet appeared, at its outset, 
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as the liberation from work and as a countervailing power; in reality, as 
was perfectly imaginable, it introduced a new work and a new power. 
This takes nothing away from the merits of the Internet, just as 
Taylorism takes nothing away from the merits of the machines, but it is an 
element that cannot be underestimated. This is the dark side of the Web, 
that we need to make explicit. Surprisingly, the greatest thinkers of the 
power of the Internet are, in my opinion, two figures that have never 
known it, and perhaps not even suspected its future existence: Schmitt, 
who emphasized that the essence of power lies in bureaucracy, and Jünger, 
who theorized the total mobilization and militarization as the essence of 
the modern world. 
The most important aspect, in my opinion, is the way in which 
documentality becomes a source of normativity. If it were not possible to 
keep traces, there would be no mind—and it is not by chance that, as I 
have noted, the mind was traditionally depicted as a tabula rasa, a support 
on which impressions and thoughts are inscribed. But without the 
possibility of inscription there would not even be social objects, which 
consist precisely in the recording of social acts, starting from the 
fundamental one of the promise. If this is the case, perhaps we should 
translate Aristotle’s sentence that man is a zoon logon echon as: “man is an 
animal endowed with inscriptions”, or rather (since one of the meanings of 
logos in Greek is “promise”, “given word”) as “man is an animal that 
promises”. “The breeding of an animal that can promise—is not this just 
the very paradox of a task which nature has set itself in regard to man?” 27 
From recording thus derives a mobilization and especially a total 
responsibilization. The Internet is an empire on which the sun never sets: 
at any time we can receive a request for work to be done, and at all times 
we are responsible for it, with a process that extends indefinitely the 
duration of work and the principle of responsibility (because the request is 
recorded). Here is what we learn from what, to me, is more than an 
example, and with which I wish to conclude. Imagine an old amnesic 
phone, in pre-answering machines and pre-cell phone times. It would ring, 
we were not at home, we would come back and not know about it—we 
lived happily and without obligations. Today it is no longer the case. Each 
“missed call” is recorded on the phone, and this call generates an 
obligation to respond, it makes the phantom quiver, it raises the pang of 
remorse in what we call “soul”. The very fact of recording makes us 
responsible: a promise made between amnesic people would not be a 
promise, it would be a series of empty words. This is why the world is 
filled with papers, files, archives. Moral responsibility, at its core, is just 
that: inscription and recording. It is by no chance that divine omniscience 
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and omnipotence are represented as the holding of a book in which 
everything is written, nothing is hidden or forgotten. 
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Notes 
 
 
1 I prepared this article in Bonn with the support of the Käte Hamburger Kolleg 
“Recht als Kultur”. 
2 With a debate started in 2011—which summed up the topics I have been working 
on for the past twenty years (see Ferraris 1997)—and that is still ongoing, both in 
Italy and on an international level (for a full overview see nuovorealismo. 
wordpress.com; for an analysis of the debate see Scarpa 2013). Among the 
numerous contributions there are several of my own writings on the topic (I 
particularly refer the reader back to Ferraris 2011a and 2012c) as well as other 
works such as Gabriel 2013 and Beuchot-Jerez 2013. For a more detailed analysis 
of some of the moves proposed in the present article, see Ferraris 2012b. 
3 Goodman 1978. 
4 Putnam 1987b, chaps. 1, 2; and Putnam 1987a. 
5 Meillassoux 2008. 
6 Ferraris 2012a. 
7 Ferraris 2001. The Gedankenexperiment through which I develop the argument of 
interaction appears in English in Ferraris 2002. 
8 Ferraris 2006 and 2013. 
9 By using the term “affordance” I am referring to a notion that has been widely 
popular last century: see Gibson 1979; Lewin 1926. Fichte already spoke of an 
“Aufforderungskaracter” of the real, see Fichte 1796, chap. 1, § 3. 
10 Ferraris 2014. 
11 I have extensively dwelt on this in Ferraris 2012b. 
12 See Rickert 1915.  
13 See Ferraris 2012b and 2005. 
14 Apart from the already mentioned Ferraris 2012b, I refer the reader back to 
Ferraris 2007, 2009 and 2010b. An important development of documentality was 
provided by Barry Smith with his analysis of “Document Acts”: see  
http://ontology.buffalo.edu/smith/articles/documentacts.pdf 
15 In this sense, writing makes social objects structurally similar to living entities. 
It is in this sense that, in Ferraris 2012b, I refer to the parallelism offered by 
Dawkins between genes and “memes” (see Dawkins 1976). 
16 See Ferraris 2011b. 
17 “It is, for example, a mistake to treat money and other such instruments as if they 
were natural phenomena like the phenomena studied in physics, chemistry, and 
biology. The recent economic crisis makes it clear that they are products of 
massive fantasy” (Searle 2010, 201). 
18 Cf. Putnam 1975, 227. 
19 Hölldobler and Wilson 2008. 
20 Lévy 1994. 
21 Ferraris 2010a. 
22 In agreement with the argument against private language proposed by 
Wittgenstein. There must be at least two people not only to produce a document, 
but also to have a language and, more generally, a rule. 
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23 Brandom 1994, cap. I. 
24 For a more detailed articulation of these two fundamental theses, see Ferraris 
2011b. 
25 Kittler 1999. The German original dates back to 1986. 
26 As is suggested by Kelly 2010. Nevertheless, it is an old idea that goes from 
Spengler to Jünger and Heidegger. 
27 Nietzsche 2003, 34. On this acknowledgment of the human specific ability to 
make promises (and, more generally, commitments and entitlements) I refer the 
reader again to the first chapter of Brandom 1994; Brandon refers in turn to Kant’s 
idea that humans are essentially “distinctively normative, or rule-governed, 
creatures” (Brandom 1994, 9). 
